Engraving and Printing

2013


 

TREASURY OIG: General Management: BEP’s Administration of the Burson- Marsteller Public Education and Awareness Contract Was Deficient 

August 2013

The Treasury Department’s Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) paid  Burson-Marsteller $112.7 million to educate the public about the redesign of the $100, $50, $20, $10 and $5 notes. BEP did not maintain complete contract file documentation nor did it properly administer the 2006 contract with Burson-Marsteller. Report

Media Coverage

Judicial Watch: U.S. Treasury Spends Over $100 Mil to Promote New Bills


 

2012


 

GAO: U.S. Coins: Benefits and Considerations for Replacing the $1 Note with a $1 Coin 

November 2012

GAO reported in February 2012 that replacing $1 notes with $1 coins could potentially provide $4.4 billion in net benefits to the federal government over 30 years. The overall net benefit was due solely to increased seigniorage and not to reduced production costs. Seigniorage is the difference between the cost of producing coins or notes and their face value; it reduces government borrowing and interest costs, resulting in a financial benefit to the government. Report

Media Coverage

Wall Street Journal: U.S. Should Replace Dollar Bills With Coins, GAO Says

Slate: Save the $1 Bill!


 

2011


 

TREASURY OIG: BEP's Network and Systems Security Was Found to Be Insufficient 

September 2011

OIG determined that BEP did not establish sufficient protection for its network and systems and should enhance its security controls to protect against threats posed by malicious insiders. Specifically, during our social engineering exercise, we successfully persuaded 23 BEP users to give us access to their computers (100 percent of those attempted) using their accounts. While impersonating BEP contractors with unescorted access to the facility, every user whom we approached gave us full access to their computer without challenge. 

OIG also identified significant deficiencies in BEP’s network and systems related to its patch management processes and system configurations. By taking advantage of these vulnerabilities, OIG was able to gain full access to the desktop, where OIG was able to create, edit, delete, and move files. OIG was also able to access files and databases on the server.